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SACRED SECRETS OR
SANCTIMONIOUS SILENCE
Teresa Stanton Collett*
At the outset I confess that I am neither a trained theologian, nor
a member of the ordained ministry; neither a canon lawyer seeking to
defend the content and structure of religious law, nor a disaffected
Catholic hoping to prove the callous disregard of fundamental human
values in the formal teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
Rather, the perspective I bring to the case of Ben Jones is that of a
Roman Catholic who has spent the past five years studying and
writing about ethical issues confronting practicing lawyers. I approach
this problem openly affirming that the Church's teachings are true
while recognizing that the application of those teachings to concrete
situations is often ambiguous or difficult.
I. PROFESSIONAL SECRETS
There is a superficial appeal to disposing of the moral issues
presented by Ben's statements to Father Samuels by characterizing
the conversation as pastoral counseling. This alters the rules
governing disclosure because the statements of Ben Jones would not
have been made during the Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation.
Therefore the priest would not be subject to the sacramental seal of
the confessional.' Rather, the priest's obligation to keep Ben's secret
would be that of any professional who receives information pursuant
to professional status. Ben's story would be considered a "profession-
* Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas; Visiting
Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School. Professors Robert G. Blakey, Gerald
Bradley, Patrick Schiltz, and Father Reginald Whitt have provided valuable comments on
an earlier draft of this Essay. The footnotes have benefitted from the hard work of my
research assistant, Tim Heverin.
1. Commentary to Canon 983 states: "The canons do not touch extra-sacramental
confidentiality, to which the ordained minister is bound as is any recipient of confidences,
but bound even more so when the relationship of the minister to the individual is
analogous to that of a professional counselor." THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 691 (James A. Coriden et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. See
also Canon 1548 § 2, 10 which exempts clerics from testifying at an ecclesiastical trial as
to information "made known to them in connection with their sacred ministry." Id. at 981.
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al secret" that could be disclosed only "where keeping the secret is
bound to cause very grave harm to the one who confided it, to the
one who received it or a third party, and where the very grave harm
can be avoided only by divulging the truth."2
Even employing this test, however, it is unclear whether Father
Samuels should disclose Ben's secret under the moral principles
embodied in danon law. The priest must determine whether the very
grave harm-the execution of an innocent man--can be avoided only
by divulging the truth that is revealed in Ben Jones's statements.
While it is true that many lay people would believe that disclosing
Ben Jones's statements would avoid the very grave harm threatened,
as a lawyer I am somewhat skeptical. The experience of other
convicted felons who have sought relief by offering new evidence
acquired after their convictions suggests that divulging the secret
would have little effect,3 especially if Ben Jones is unwilling to come
forward and corroborate Father Samuels' testimony.
The seminal case illustrating this is Herrera v. Collins.4 Herrera
was convicted of murdering two law enforcement officers. Evidence
tending to establish his guilt included (1) bloodstains matching the
victim's blood found on Herrera's blue jeans and wallet and on the
seat in the car Herrera often drove, (2) Herrera's social security card
found at the scene of the first murder, (3) eyewitness identifications,
and (4) his handwritten letter describing the murders.5
The U.S. Supreme Court described the facts and issue presented
by Herrera's appeal of the district court's denial of habeas relief:
2. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2491 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (rejecting petitioner's claim that
habeas relief was required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to actual
innocence where after-acquired evidence was not sufficiently convincing of petitioner's
innocence); Stockton v. Angelone, 70 F.3d 12 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting habeas petition
where claim of actual innocence is supported by affidavits, none of which contain
eyewitness accounts); Phillips v. Walker, No. 92 Civ. 8018, 1996 WL 1236 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
2, 1996) (holding that a statement by a state witness that she felt pressured by state
attorney does not warrant habeas relief on the grounds of after-acquired evidence of
perjury). But see Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (permitting habeas review where
defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to present alibi witnesses
who would corroborate defendant's claim of actual innocence). On remand, Schlup v.
Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mo. 1995), the district court granted a hearing of the habeas
petition where the claim of actual innocence was supported by several affidavits of
eyewitnesses, all of whom adequately explained their prior refusal to testify.
4. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
5. Id. at 394-95.
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Petitioner Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death in January 1982. He
unsuccessfully challenged the conviction on direct appeal and
state collateral proceedings in the Texas state courts, and in
a federal habeas petition. In February 1992-10 years after
his conviction-he urged in a second federal habeas petition
that he was "actually innocent" of the murder for which he
was sentenced to death, and that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law
therefore forbid his execution. He supported this claim with
affidavits tending to show that his now-dead brother, rather
than he, had been the perpetrator of the crime.6
A majority of the Justices held that while execution of an
innocent person may violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
Herrera had not made a sufficient showing of his "actual innocence"
to require habeas relief7 Herrera was executed by lethal injection on
the morning of May 12, 1993.8
Claims of actual innocence by death row inmates were reconsid-
ered in Schiup v. Delo.9 The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel which alleged that the attorney
failed to call alibi witnesses who would have established the defen-
dant's actual innocence. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
directed trial courts to grant relief in cases where the habeas
petitioner demonstrates that a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Actual
innocence is established if "it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted ... in the light of the new
evidence."10
6. Id, at 393.
7. Id. at 417. The affidavits offered to support Herrera's claim of actual innocence
included one from an attorney and former state court judge who had represented
Herrera's brother, Raul, in an unrelated matter. This attorney said that Raul had
confessed to the killings to him. Other affidavits included one from Raul's son-who was
nine years old at the time of the shootings-who said that he was in the car with his father
when he committed the crimes; one from a former cellmate of Raul who said that Raul
had admitted to the killings while in jail; and one from a former schoolmate of the
brothers who said that Raul had admitted the killings. Id. at 396-97.
8. Herrera Proclaims Innocence to the End Before Execution, HOUSTON POST, May
13, 1993, at A20.
9. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
10. Id. at 867.
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Herrera and Schiup illustrate the basis for my skepticism about
whether revealing Ben Jones's secrets will avoid the grave harm of
Frank Smith's execution. In order to obtain relief from the federal
courts, Frank would have to show the existence of a constitutional
violation to satisfy standing requirements for habeas corpus relief and
his actual innocence to satisfy the Schiup test. Nothing in our facts
indicates a constitutional violation and, absent Ben Jones's willingness
to corroborate Father Samuels' testimony, it is unlikely that a court
would find that no reasonable juror would have convicted when
presented with the testimony of Father Samuels."
Alternatively, Frank Smith might seek clemency from the
governor in light of the new evidence. However, if the only evidence
is the testimony of Father Samuels, it seems unlikely that the
governor will pardon Frank or commute his sentence. 2
Arguably, so long as there is any possibility that the execution of
Frank Smith could be avoided through disclosing Ben's secrets, Father
Samuels ought to do so, particularly in light of the Church's general
disapproval of the death penalty. 3 This argument assumes either
11. This analysis assumes that Father Samuels would be allowed to testify.
Evidentiary rules prohibiting hearsay and privileged communication would probably forbid
admission of his testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 501, 801-04.
12. See Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins.: The Gateway of Innocence for Death.
Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943 (1994); George M.
Ahrend, Note, Herrera v. Collins: Does Actual Innocence Warrant Federal Habeas Corpus
Relief?, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 425 (1994); Kelli Hinson, Comment, Post-Conviction
Determination of Innocence for Death Row Inmates, 48 SMU L. REv. 231 (1994); Tara L.
Swafford, Note, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That Innocents Are Not
Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 403 (1995). For an examination of clemency boards
as they exist in Texas, see Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain Like
Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates'
Last Appeals, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 375 (1995). For an examination of the procedural due
process questions stemming from Herrera and clemency, see Daniel Lim, State Due Process
Guarantees for Meaningful Death Penalty Clemency Proceedings, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 47 (1994); Daniel T. Kobil, Note, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations:
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201 (1993); Henry
Pietrkowski, Note, The Diffusion of Due Process in Capital Cases of Actual Innocence
After Herrera, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391 (1995).
13. Pope John Paul II writes:
On this matter [the death penalty] there is a growing tendency, both in the
Church and in civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way
or even that it be abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the
context of a system of penal justice ever more in line with human dignity and
thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of
the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder caused by the
offence." Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social
rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a
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that avoiding the execution of an innocent man is a moral good that
must be pursued regardless of the cost, or that the possibility of
achieving this good outweighs the moral cost of revealing the
professional secret. The first assumption relies upon the primacy of
the good posited and rejects a utilitarian calculus. The second
assumption accepts the legitimacy of a utilitarian analysis, finding that
revelation is warranted by the good to be achieved. 4 If it is ethically
acceptable to weigh the possible good obtained through disclosure
against its costs, it is still not readily apparent that disclosure is ethical
in this case.
The facts reveal that Ben Jones is a lapsed Catholic who sought
out Father Samuels after an extended separation from the Church.
While revealing Ben Jones's secret may not violate the canon law of
the Church since it is not under the seal of confession, Ben Jones
probably will feel that Father Samuels betrayed his trust if the secret
is disclosed without his permission. He is likely to perceive the
distinction between a professional secret and a sealed confession as
merely a legalistic distinction with no real moral substance.
The sense of betrayal and subsequent disillusionment that may
follow disclosure of Ben's secrets could lead Ben to reject his faith in
Christ and the teachings of the Church. By repudiating his faith, Ben
would become an apostate. Apostasy is one of the sins that, if
unrepented, may result in eternal separation from God.' Father
Samuels cannot disregard this possible outcome. He is charged with
the solemn duty to safeguard the soul of each person entrusted to his
care as priest. 6
condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this
way authority also fulfills the purpose of defending public order and ensuring
people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and
help to change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.
It is clear that to achieve these purposes, the nature and extent of the
punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to
the extreme of executing the offender, except in cases of absolute necessity: in
other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today
however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal
system, such cases are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE [EVANGELIUM VITAE] 56, at 99 (1995).
14. Pope John Paul II has written on the limited legitimacy of consequentialism as a
system of moral reasoning. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH
[VERITATIS SPLENDOR] 74, 75 (1993).
15. 1983 CODE c.751 (explaining that "apostacy is the total repudiation of the
Christian faith").
16. Pope Pius IX, Amantissimi Redemptoris §5 (1858), in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS
(1740-1878) 351 (Claudia Carlen IHM ed., 1981).
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So, assuming the moral legitimacy of considering the anticipated
consequences in this case, we are left weighing the possibility of
avoiding a great evil-the execution of an innocent man-against the
possibility of causing a great evil-Ben's loss of eternal salvation.
Also weighing against disclosure is the possibility that the revelation
of Ben's secret will be publicized and cause others to avoid seeking
the spiritual counseling that is fundamental to the ministry of Christ.
Absent more facts that increase the possibility that revealing Ben's
secret would successfully stop the execution, Father Samuels should
not reveal Ben's secret without his consent.
This does not excuse Father Samuels from vigorously encouraging
Ben to reveal the truth to the authorities. Such encouragement
should include every moral and practical argument that the priest can
marshal, up to and including discussions of God's vengeance for
allowing innocent blood to be shed. Any communication technique,
short of coercion, should be used if it enhances the success of
persuading Ben to "do the right thing." But in the end, it is Ben who
must disclose the truth in order to avoid the great evil-not Father
Samuels.
II. SEALED CONFESSION
Does the preceding analysis change if the statements were made
to Father Samuels during the Sacrament of Penance and Reconcilia-
tion? Absolutely. Father S amuels' silence is required regardless of
his actual ability to stop Frank Smith's execution.
Canon law provides: "The sacramental seal is inviolable;
therefore, it is a crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent
by word or in any other manner or for any reason."'7 Priests who
violate this canon by making known the contents of the confession
and identity of the penitent-by name, through the circumstances
described, or by implicatiohf-are subject to automatic excommunica-
tion. 8 The seriousness of this punishment is illustrated by the fact
that only the pope can reinstate the priest to full communion with the
17. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. The Code uses the Latin word nefas to stress the gravity
of the offense. Nefas is defined as "[a]n offence against divine law, an impious act,
sacrilege." OXFORD LATIN DICrIONARY 1167 (5th ed. 1976). Nefas may have moral
implications as well. It is secondarily defined as "[a]n offense against moral law, a wicked
act, crime." Id.
18. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1. The excommunication prohibits the priest from exercising
any ministry or public worship. Id c.1331, § 1.
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Church. 9 Even priests who reveal the contents of a confession in
such a way that little danger exists that the penitent will be identified
are subject to discipline, the severity of which is "in accord with the
seriousness of the offense."
20
If Father Samuels learned of Ben's secrets in the course of a
confession, the seal of confession forbids disclosure, regardless of the
good that may be achieved as a result.
In her book, Ethics in the Sanctuary: Examining the Practices of
Organized Religion, Margaret P. Battin provides this chilling example
of the seal's strength:
In a much-publicized case in Langerberg, West Germany,
several years ago, Jurgen Bartsch, a fifteen-year-old butch-
er's apprentice, confessed to his priest that he had commit-
ted a murder. The priest attempted to persuade Bartsch to
give himself up to the police. When he was unable to do so,
the priest followed Roman Catholic church law requiring
absolute confidentiality of the confessional and did not
reveal information about the murder or Bartsch's intentions.
Bartsch committed three more murders-all of them eleven-
year-old boys, all of whom he subjected to sexual torture
prior to killing them-before he was caught four years
later.21
19. Id. c.1388, § 1. "A confessor who directly violates the seal of confession incurs an
automatic (latae sententiae) excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See; if he does so
only indirectly, he is to be punished in accord with the seriousness of the offense." Id.
The canon's comment stresses the seriousness of this offense.
If the penitent and his/her sin are easily known from the confessor's behavior,
there is a direct violation of the seal, punishable by a latae sententiae excommuni-
cation. The seriousness of the offense is clear from the fact that it is one of only
five excommunications reserved to the Holy See.
COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 927.
20. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1. Indirect violations occur when there "is only a danger that
the penitent and sin will be revealed" as opposed to direct violations where "the penitent
and his/her sin are easily known from the confessor's behavior." COMMENTARY, supra
note 1, at 927.
21. MARGARET P. BATTIN, ETHICS IN THE SANCrUARY: EXAMINING THE PRACTICES
OF ORGANIZED RELIGION, 21 (1990) (citing Murder Case Debate on Priest's Duty, THE
TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 1967; and How Secret the Confessional? TIME, Dec. 22, 1967).
As a personal aside, I am thankful the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review did not pattern the hypothetical facts after this case.
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In her notes accompanying this example, Professor Battin reveals that
Bartsch confessed to seventy other attempts, in addition to the four
murders for which he was convicted.22
The dilemma experienced by the priest in this true story places
our example of Father Samuels and Ben Jones in a less dramatic light.
Nothing in our facts indicates that Ben poses an ongoing threat to the
safety of others within the community. Nonetheless, the fact remains
that Frank Smith is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted,
and that he is scheduled to die within a week of Ben's confession to
Father Samuels. Under these circumstances, should Father Samuels
disclose the contents of Ben's confession in an attempt to preserve the
life of Frank Jones?
The first half of this Essay examined the possible consequences
of this particular disclosure and concluded that disclosure was not
warranted. That conclusion was due in large part to the probability
that disclosure would not save Frank, given the legal standards
governing post-conviction relief for claims of "actual innocence."
Certainly, the conclusion that disclosure is unwarranted is not
weakened by changing the church law from permissive disclosure to
absolute silence. However, the outcome of any particular problem
will change under consequentialist reasoning if the probable conse-
quences change.
The rule governing professional secrets, which admits an
exception based upon a particular consequence-avoiding a grave
harm '--can be distinguished from the rule regarding secrets
revealed in the confessional, which admits no exceptions regardless of
the particular or general consequences.24 In discussing the morality
of a rule that absolutely prohibits disclosure, it is important to remove
the consequentialist "out." Therefore let us assume that disclosure by
Father Samuels alone could stop the execution of Frank Smith.
Should Father Samuels break the seal?
Under the standard governing professional secrets, if disclosing
the secret would stop the execution of Frank Smith, the secret should
be disclosed, even in the face of the possible apostasy of Ben Jones
as a result. Is this also true if the secret is revealed during confes-
sion? The answer given by canon law is no. Is this defensible under
consequentialist reasoning? In answering this question, we must
22. Id. at 271 n.1.
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
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examine the interests that the seal is intended to protect by a
complete prohibition.
III. INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE SEAL
The seal of confession is said to derive from Christ's command-
ment to confess our sins.2 In order to assist in the fulfillment of this
command, the Church enjoins its priests to remain silent concerning
the existence or contents of a confession. This is done so that
individually, and as the People of God, penitents need not fear
earthly consequences from revealing post-baptismal sins as a part of
seeking reconciliation with the Church and forgiveness from God.26
A. Benefits to the Penitent
Access to the sealed confessional is of value to the penitent
because it inspires compliance with Christ's command. It also
provides a safe space, and thus moral reflection, conversion, and
reformation. Finally the seal provides evidence of the possibility of
radical transformation through grace-a transformation that is so
dramatic that the old sinful being is no longer spoken of or remem-
bered.
B. Benefits to the Priest
The seal is of value to the priest because it allows him to hear of
the most base passions and actions without the possibility of interven-
ing through human agency. It encourages reliance upon God's power
to transform the sinner, rather than reliance upon the priest's power
to intervene through human acts that he may or may not be capable
of performing. Ultimately the seal protects the priest from the sin of
despair-the despair of one who knows the worst of human nature
and believes that only human will stands as a barrier to a world
dominated by evil.
25. JOHN R. ROOs, THE SEAL OF CONFESSION 1-3 (1960); see also James 5:16
("[c]onfess your faults to one another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed.");
John 20:23 ("[w]hosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever
sins ye retain, they are retained."); Matthew 16:19 ("whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth
shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in
heaven.").
26. 1983 CODE c.959; see Dexter Brewer, The Right of a Penitent to Release the
Confessor from the SeaL" Considerations in Canon Law and American Law, 54 JURIST 424,
429-30 (1994).
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C. Benefits to the Church
The Church benefits from the seal because it assists in fulfilling
its mission of reconciling all people with God. Although reconcilia-
tion with God is possible without the intercession of the priest,'7 the
existence of the Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation evidences
God's continual offer of grace to those who regret their sinful acts,
confess them, and resolve to avoid sin in the future.' Without the
seal of confession, the ability of the Church to be a living sign of
God's continual offer of grace would be diminished. For many the
offer of grace would come at too high a price-the price of potential
disgrace and retribution by those who have been harmed by the
penitent's sins.
The Church further benefits from the seal because it reinforces
the separation of the Kingdom of God from the realm of earthly
principalities. It affirms the independence and superiority of the
Church's claim over the spiritual dimension of life.29 Imagine the
plight of the priest hearing the confession of a French resistance
fighter who killed two Nazi sympathizers while they slept. Should the
contents of the confession be revealed to assure that "justice is
done?" Should it be revealed to save the other villagers whom the
Nazis threaten to kill if the murderer is not discovered?
Or to use a more contemporary example, what should the Irish
priest do when a revolutionary confesses involvement in the killing of
British soldiers? Is the priest's situation the same when hearing the
confession of the French resistance fighter and the Irish revolution-
ary? Does the resolution of the priest's dilemma depend upon the
nature of the political regimes in power-evil versus morally
ambiguous or even virtuous-the status of the victims-sympathizers
versus' soldiers-the anticipated consequences of revealing or
concealing the information obtained in the confessional?
The Church's answer is that the seal does not depend upon any
of these considerations. The seal depends upon the obligation of the
27. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 1434-1439 (1994). Reconciliation
with the Church is accomplished liturgically by the Sacrament of Penance and Reconcilia-
tion. Id. §§ 1422, 1440.
28. Al. §§ 1440, 1441, 1446, 1450; see 1983 CODE c.987, 988 (discussing disposition of
the penitent and confession obligations); Roos, supra note 25, at 25-48.
29. Kenneth L. Grasso, Beyond Liberalism Human Dignity, the Free Society, and the
Second Vatican Council, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM 30
(Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995).
SACRED SECRETS
Church to lead people to obey the command of God to confess our
sins, and the fulfillment of God's promise "and their sins and
inequities I will remember no more."3 The promises of God, and
thus the Church as God's sacramental instrument, are not conditioned
upon particular human consequences or the state's recognition of the
promises. The Church must remain free to continuously invite people
to respond to God's grace and to critique the existing political order
effectively. The seal of confession is only a part of maintaining that
freedom, but nonetheless a very important part.3'
IV. FATHER SAMUELS' DILEMMA
Would the interests of the penitent, priest, and Church be
compromised by revealing Ben Jones's confession of murder? Do the
justifications offered for protecting the resistance fighter in Vichy,
France apply with equal force to the murderer who seeks to avoid just
punishment? Can reconciliation truly occur when the sinner is willing
to compound the sin by allowing an innocent man to die? It is this
final question that reveals the paradox of the Christian faith. All who
claim redemption through Jesus Christ have already accepted that an
innocent man was executed for the sins of others, and that reconcilia-
tion with God occurs through His death?' By Christ's victory over
death, He transformed the human understanding of death's power.
Father Samuels' dilemma arises from a conflict between the
moral prohibition "thou shalt not kill" '33 and the imperative to
"rescue those who are being dragged to death. 3 4 Frank Smith's
execution, if it occurs, will be the result of several moral failures: the
legal system, where conviction of an innocent man is possible; the
Church, which has yet to transform the system of justice to preclude
the taking of human life absent the most compelling of circumstances;
and Ben Jones, whose choice of temporal freedom and life outweighs
his recognition of the obligation to' rescue Frank through 'the
acceptance of just punishment for his deeds. Ultimately if Frank
Smith is executed, it will be because we all have failed to construct a
30. Hebrews 10:17.
31. See 1983 CODE c.834, § 1; Grasso, supra note 29, at 30.
32. Romans 5:10.
33. Exodus 20:13.
34. Proverbs 24:11.
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system that values human life over vengeance and economic efficien-
Is this the right result? Absolutely not. Yet violating the seal of
confession is not the right result either. By revealing Ben's confes-
sion, Father Samuels would seriously compromise the interests the
seal protects. Ben's interest in following God's command to confess
his sins is compromised by the creation of a strong disincentive in the
form of temporal punishment. His interest in a safe place for self-
examination and moral reformation is destroyed by the fact that he
can have no confidence that his sins will not be revealed. By
disclosing his confession, Father Samuels destroys the Church's living
witness of the transforming power of God's grace.
Father Samuels' interests are compromised as well, in that he
assumes the burden of achieving the "right result." By undertaking
to rescue Frank Smith through the use of the confession, he must be
successful to protect himself from subsequent doubts about the price
he made Ben pay for the results achieved. If unsuccessful, he risks
the despair experienced by many of the faithful when they no longer
depend upon God.
Finally, the price the Church pays for the disclosure will be
extraordinary. By breaking the seal to benefit others, the Church
gives lie to the idea that each person is uniquely important to God.
The Church teaches, in the words of a current poster, "God loves
each of us as if there were only one of us." That preciousness and
unlimited love is belied by the weighing of others' interests in
deciding whether to keep the seal. On a more pragmatic level, when
disclosure is permissive, it is but a short step to make it mandatory
when the costs of silence are perceived as being too high. The human
agency that would enforce disclosure would be the State, and thus the
independence of the Church is eroded.
The price of free will is very high. It includes all of the human
suffering that occurs when people choose wrongly. Yet moral
goodness can only exist through free will. Without free will, every act
is merely an automatic response. Free will becomes a will to
goodness only as a freely chosen response to the call of God.
36
35. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 14, at 3-12.
36. Vatican II Ecumenical Council, Declaration on Religious Freedom [Dignitatls
Humanae] § 2 (1965), in 2 DECREES OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 1001, 1002-03
(Norman P. Tanner S.J. ed., 1990).
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The Church is the visible presence of God among His people.
The priest who hears the penitent's confession can only invite, never
coerce, a fuller response to God's call to goodness. To violate the
seal of confession would be to allow worldly consequences to intrude
into one of the sacred places where the faithful meet God. The priest
who discloses the penitent's confession violates not only his vows as
a priest, but the promise of the One who said, "Your sins I remember
no more."3 7 Father Samuels must maintain his silence and pray for
the continuing conversion of Ben Jones, and the salvation, both
temporal and eternal, of Frank Smith.
37. Isaiah 43"25.
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